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Introduction
Except when income taxes are purely individual based, the tax regimes applied to couples typically imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. A marriage penalty involves higher taxes for married couples than for two otherwise identical single individuals with exactly the same income; a bonus implies lower taxes for married couples. A marriage penalty applies, for instance, in the US; see Alm et al. (1999) .
In France or Germany, on the other hand, there is a marriage bonus due to income splitting. 1 While there appears to be a trend towards more individualized tax systems, very few systems are effectively completely neutral with respect to the marital status; see OECD (2005; 2017) . Table I2 . 3 in OECD (2015) shows that a majority of countries nominally have an individual based tax system. Table I2 .1, on the other hand, shows that this is very often just a matter of legal terminology. Even when the tax unit is referred to as individual based, there is in most instances some correction reflecting the marital status.
To sum up, in reality in most tax systems a couple's tax liability depends on its marital status. Many systems are less extreme than the French or the German ones, but they are nevertheless not completely neutral. Consequently, they potentially affect a couple's decision to get married in the first place. Empirical papers suggest that the bonus or penalty have little impact on the marriage decision, which is rather surprising since the bonus can be rather sizeable like in France or Germany; see Leturcq (2012) for an overview of this literature. 2 1 In France and Germany each spouse's taxable income is defined as half of total family income. The couple's total tax liability is then twice the tax calculated for each spouse. Because of the concavity of the tax function this reduces the couples' tax liability unless both spouses have identical incomes or, at least, are in the same tax bracket. 2 Leturcq (2012) concentrates on civil unions rather than on marriage. However, in the introduction
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The existing theoretical literature on couple taxation mostly ignores how taxation affects the decision to get married. 3 As pointed out by Kaplow (2008, page 342) "... a scheme that is ideal on distributive grounds is likely to influence marriage decisions."In other words, it is unlikely that a purely individualistic tax (which would be neutral with regard to the marriage decision) is optimal." 4 But it is not clear whether this optimal joint taxation fosters or discourages marriages. In principle, this can go both ways: with a German or French style income splitting it "pays"to get married (as long as spouses have different incomes), while the US system goes in the opposite direction. To the best of our knowledge, there is no general result in tax theory concerning the desirability of a marriage bonus or penalty. Either way, assuming that the marriage decision would be otherwise privately optimal, the effect a tax system has on this decision represents an extra distortion, which should be accounted for when designing the optimal policy.
In this paper we study the impact of a marriage bonus or penalty on the decision to get married. From a positive perspective, this provides an analysis of how real world tax systems affect the decision to get married. But first and foremost our analysis is meant to provide guidance to future research on the optimal taxation of couples. As Kaplow puts it, the impact of a tax system on the decision to get married represents an additional distortion to be accounted for in couple taxation models. We show that this distortion may be far more complex than one could expect. Specifically, we show that a marriage bonus may not increase the number of marriages while a penalty may induce additional marriages. Furthermore, Kaplow's implicit assumption that in the she extensively discusses the literature which has looked at the impact of the tax system on marriage, mainly in the US, but also in France. 3 See, for instance, Boskin and Sheshinski, (1983); Apps and Rees (1999); Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2012), or, more recently, Cremer et al. (2016) . Chade and Ventura (2002) do study tax design with endogenous marriages, but they focus on tax reform rather than on optimal taxation. They consider a marriage-market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents. They show that reforms leading to more neutral systems (which for the US means reducing the marriage penalty) may increase or decrease the number of couples who get married. In a follow up paper Chade and Ventura (2005) consider a simplified version of their model for which they can study tax optimization albeit with very restricted instruments. They show that it is optimal to give a married couple a preferential tax treatment for this allows to correct an inefficiency in the matching process. 4 For a given family structure, the optimal tax schedule is determined by a number of possibly conflicting effects. These include issues of redistribution between and within couples, labor supply elasticities (Ramsey considerations), efficiency of household production, etc.; see Apps and Rees (2009, Ch 6); or Kaplow (2008, Ch 12) for detailed overviews.
laissez-faire the marriage decision is privately optimal may not be true. In other words, the "distortion" of the individual marriage decision implied by the tax system may effectively be welfare improving. We consider a model where two potential spouses play a marriage proposal game at the end of which they may get married, live together without formal marriage, or split up. This is a signaling game where proposing, or more generally getting married, is costly but can indicate strong love (a high quality match). The striking property we obtain is that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married. If it is sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and there is only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer potential couples get married. Similarly, a marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability. Specifically, the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which was otherwise not possible.
This setting is rather specific, but the results suggest that integrating the decision to get married into a family taxation model may have to account for a priori surprising behavioral responses. A marriage subsidy may not enhance marriages while a penalty does not necessarily discourage marriages. Furthermore, marriage decisions in the laissez-faire are not necessarily efficient. This is quite in line with the empirical results which show little impact at the aggregate level. Since the effect can go both ways (depending on the couple's characteristics) on aggregate these will cancel out (in part). Another interesting lesson is that the impact of the tax system on the marriage decision does not necessarily represent a "distortion", that is a welfare cost. In some cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient; it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded.
Signaling in the marriage market has been analyzed as a mean to overcome asymmetric information and allow profitable matching. However, earlier studies emphasize the role of status goods and conspicuous consumption as signals of income, which represents a crucial but unobservable characteristic evaluated by potential partners (see De we assume throughout the paper that
In words, condition (1) implies that absent any information acquisition, Robin's expected value of θ S is smaller than her reservation utility. Consequently, Robin prefers tion and survival. Bronsert et al. (2016) present a model where a woman interested in the wealth of a potential husband designs a screening mechanism by assigning a probability of marriage to possible amounts of wasteful consumption. Hence, screening leads to status consumption and wasteful gift giving. 6 As illustrated by the choice of the player's name our game is meant to represent the proposal game of any pair of potential partners irrespective of their gender. This gender neutrality is implicit in all our arguments even though we often refer to Sam as "he" and Robin as "she". This concession turned out to be necessary to keep avoid the tedious "he or she". Using the plural of the singular "they" would have made many statements ambiguous.
to look for a new partner when the initial uncertainty about Sam's love persists. Condition (2), on the other hand, implies that Robin wants to accept Sam's proposal if she knows for sure that his love is strong (θ S = θ H ), while she would refuse the proposal if she knew that his feelings are weak (θ S = θ L ).
Sam's action implies a cost ϕ S (a S ). We assume that ϕ S (0) = ϕ S (c) = 0, while This cost decreases with θ S , the intensity of Sam's feelings, for example because Sam enjoys, to a certain extent, planning for the proposal and spending money for the engagement ring and this is especially true when he is deeply in love with Robin.
After observing Sam's action, Robin chooses a R ∈ {y, n}, meaning that Robin can either accept Sam's proposal (a R = y) or break the relationship (a R = n).
The two partners' utilities are given by (1) and (2) Robin always prefers to look for a new partner when Sam's feelings are weak, or when she is uncertain about Sam's feelings, that is
This is the most interesting case because it implies that Sam's and Robin's preferences are not perfectly aligned. This creates some incentives to lie. Specifically, when weakly in love Sam has an incentive to try to persuade Robin that he is deeply in love in order to stay together. As a consequence, a simple communication like "I am deeply in love with you" would represent mere cheap talk and would not be credible. Conversely, when deeply in love Sam may want to invest in a costly proposal to make the transmission of information about his feelings credible. 8 The timing of actions is the following. First, Nature draws the type of Sam, Robin's utility when staying with Sam can then be rewritten as
Robin will choose to remain with Sam (a R = y) if and only if her posterior beliefs λ(a S ) are sufficiently large. Conversely, given θ L < E [θ S ] < U R , Robin will break the relationship when learning that Sam's feeling are weak, or when there is no information transmission.
We will focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in pure strategies.
Marriage or cohabitation?
Let us determine the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists. We are in- This separating equilibrium exists if the two partners' incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. In particular, when θ S = θ H , Sam must prefer to pay the cost of the marriage proposal and to be perceived as strongly in love instead of proposing cohabitation, and being perceived as weakly in love, in which case Robin would break the relationship. This requires
When instead θ S = θ L , Sam must prefer asking to live together, being perceived as weakly in love and remaining without a partner instead of asking for marriage and being perceived as strongly in love, that is 
Given that the cost of the marriage proposal is higher for a type-θ L than for a type-
is not empty and the separating equilibrium we are studying is feasible.
Our assumptions then imply that Robin's choices are optimal for her updated beliefs, λ (m) = 1 andλ (c) = 0, and given Sam's strategies. Specifically, when a S = c Robin's optimal choice is to break the relationship because, (2) . When instead a S = m, Robin's optimal choice is to accept
which follows again from
Condition (2).
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain this separating equilibrium are, for instance, given byλ (a S ) = 0 ∀a S = m.
What happens when (3) When (3) is satisfied, signaling allows information disclosure so that partners whose utility from living together is high are able to benefit from their good prospects. Potential partners who are weakly in love optimally opt for the outside-option and their relationship breaks. In this case, the signaling mechanism is beneficial from a welfare perspective because it allows the potential partners to overcome the problem of asymmetric information so that the "efficient" marriages are made possible. However, the information transmission comes at a cost, which the deeply in love Sam has to pay to 
and Sam's incentive constraints are now given by
and
Hence, a marriage bonus relaxes (IC B H ) but reinforces (IC B L ). This does not come as a surprise. The bonus will make a proposal more attractive for the high-type Sam; this is a "good thing" and makes the existence of a separating equilibrium more likely. However, the bonus will also make a proposal more attractive for the low-type Sam which is a "bad thing"from our perspective.
The condition for separation on Sam's side is now
This expression shows that the introduction of a marriage bonus shifts the interval of values for U S for which Sam can credibly signal his type to the right.
In addition, the introduction of the bonus B may affect Robin's best reply. Specifically, when no information is transmitted, or when she knows for sure that Sam's type is θ L , she will continue to refuse marriage or cohabitation only as long as
When B = 0 these conditions are satisfied from assumption (1) Condition (6), but the opposite is not true. In words, (5) requires that Robin continues to refuse Sam's proposal to live together if she knew that his feelings are weak, which is a requirement for the separating equilibrium.
Comparing (3) and (4) and using (5)-(6) establishes the following proposition. The second case occurs when the marriage bonus implies that (5) no longer holds and a new type of pooling equilibrium with marriage crowding-in emerges (case (2) of Proposition 2). Sam's optimal strategy is again a S = m ∀θ S . But now Robin accepts the marriage proposal because remaining with Sam is better than the outside option, even when no information is transmitted. In this pooling equilibrium all partners stay together and marry even when Sam's feelings for Robin are weak.
In all situations described in point (ii) of the proposition, the marriage bonus de-stroys signaling and thus reduces welfare in that either efficient marriages are not concluded (case 1) or inefficient marriages are induced (case 2).
Observe that to assess the impact of B on welfare one has to account for the fact that the bonus must somehow be financed. To measure welfare with a B different from zero we thus use the total surplus generated by the concluded marriages (including that due to B) minus the total cost of financing the bonus. This is equivalent to evaluating total surplus generated by marriages without counting the B's in individual utilities.
This proposition provides a rather negative view of the marriage bonus. That a marriage bonus distorts the decision to get married is not surprising in itself; see the Kaplow quote in the Introduction. From that perspective two main lessons emerge from our proposition. First, unlike traditional distortions in taxation theory, the marriage distortion is not continuous in B; once the critical threshold (B/2 = U S −(k + 1) θ L +Φ)
is reached, we have a discrete switch involving a drastic change in regime and a complete destruction of information transmission. 11 Second, the sign of the distortion may be at odds with intuition because the bonus may effectively lead to fewer marriages.
Recall that Proposition 2 assumes that condition (4) is satisfied when B = 0. When this is not true, a number of mostly trivial cases can arise. One interesting result emerges, though. Assume that (IC B H ) is violated for B = 0. Then, a suitably designed marriage bonus may have a positive impact and make signaling possible. Recall, that the interval of U S for which condition (4) holds depends on B. For any given U S one can thus find levels of B for which (4) is satisfied. If this can be done without violating (6) then the bonus induces a separating equilibrium and thus enables information transmission. Now the sign of the distortion is as expected (a bonus produces more marriages), and the marriage bonus impacts on the marriage decision in such a way that welfare increases. Specifically, by making signaling possible it induces efficient marriages.
Marriage or cohabitation under a marriage penalty
The previous section has considered the introduction of a marriage bonus and has shown that it may produce some unexpected results. In particular, it may prevent some marriages from being concluded. We now examine the case where the income taxation implies a marriage penalty so that B < 0. We study the two cases separately because it turns out the they are not exactly symmetrical. A marriage penalty will reinforce the incentive constraint of the high-type Sam but relax that of the low type. It won't affect the decision of Robin if she is uninformed, or believes for sure that Sam is of the low type; in either case she'll continue to refuse the proposal. However, the penalty may also make a proposal unattractive which she firmly believes emanates from a Sam who is strongly in love.
Once again we start with a situation where B = 0 so that the equilibrium entails separation with marriage. This yields the following counterpart to Proposition 2. and Robin refuses cohabitation so that the couple always breaks.
While Proposition 2 described the surprising property that a marriage bonus may actually prevent some marriages from being concluded, Proposition 3 does not show a similarly surprising result that a penalty may actually create marriages. But since the considered reference point is a situation where signaling is possible, it is clear from the outset that a penalty can only reduce the number of marriages.
However, a penalty can also produce less expected results if we consider a different reference point. This is illustrated by the following proposition. 
Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of a marriage bonus or penalty on the decision to get married. We have considered a model where two potential spouses play a marriage proposal game at the end of which they may get married, live together without formal marriage, or split up. There is asymmetric information between the partners and we have concentrated on the case where absent of a credible transmission of information the couple would split. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love (a high quality match). The striking property we obtain is that within this setting a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married. If the bonus is sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer potential couples get married remains.
In this case, the partners, whose union would otherwise be efficient, split. Similarly, a marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability. Specifically, the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which would otherwise not be possible. Our results also imply that marriage decisions in the laissez-faire are not necessarily privately optimal. In some cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient; it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded. However, when the signaling mechanism is operative, unless too small to have an impact, both bonuses or penalties will make the marriage decision less efficient.
Throughout the paper we have concentrated on a single couple identified by given parameter values. In reality, these parameters are likely to differ across couples. While any conjecture about their distribution would be highly speculative, one can expect that the different cases we have considered (as well as the "trivial" cases we have neglected) coexist in reality. Consequently, positive and negative effects of the bonus or penalty may at least in part cancel out through aggregation. This can explain that the empirical studies mentioned in the Introduction typically find that the tax regime applied to married couples appears to have little impact on the decision to get married. 12 But even when the effect on the total number of marriages is small, this does not necessarily mean that the welfare impact of the tax regime is also small.
Turning to policy design, to the extent that the tax system potentially "distorts"a privately optimal marriage decision, one might think that this is an argument to move to a more individual based tax. This would mitigate the marriage distortion, which for the rest has to be balanced against the redistributive benefits of a non-individual tax.
This argument certainly applies when potential couples have full information so that marriage decisions are (hopefully) privately optimal. 13 In our incomplete information setting it continues to go through for the couples where, for instance, the signaling mechanism is destroyed by a bonus, or where efficient marriages are crowded out by a penalty. However, our results show that for other couples it may play in the opposite direction. So overall, the way the optimal tax system is affect by endogenous marriage decisions depends on the distribution of parameters in the population.
Our analysis has also ignored children. In other words, we consider fertility decisions as occurring "downstream", once our game has been played. This in itself is a reasonable assumption in that fertility choices only become relevant if the couple does not split and decides either to get married, or to live in a civil union. However, in reality the tax treatment of couples is often intertwined with that of children. Children typically entitle the couple to various tax breaks, but very often these differ between married and civil union couples. From the perspective of our model this may effectively change the levels of the marriage penalty or bonus, at least in the case where the potential partners anticipate their fertility decisions. However, for the rest, this does not change our analysis.
Sam chooses the action a S ∈ {0, c, m}, where the strategies have the same interpretation and economic consequences as in the main text. Assume that (1) and (2) continue to hold. In words, Robin prefers to look for a new partner when the initial uncertainty about the quality of the matching persists. And she wants to accept Sam's proposal if she knows for sure that the matching quality is high (θ S = θ H ), while she refuses if she realizes that the quality is low (θ S = θ L ). The difference from the specification in the main text is that, when Robin and Sam remain together, Robin's utility is increasing in the matching's quality, whereas Sam always obtains the benefit M, irrespective of the matching quality. Our main results are obtained for the case where M is large enough to ensure M ≥ U S , meaning that Sam prefers to remain with Robin if the proposal cost ϕ S (a S ) is not too large.
This alternative interpretation of
If the marriage proposal is accepted, Sam's utility is:
which is isomorphic to the one we presented in the main text (U S = (k + 1) θ S − Φ) and implies that all our results continue to hold. 14 However, here the signaling cost is paid only with probability (1 − θ S ) so that this signaling mechanism is Pareto superior to the one presented in the main text.
